Anthropocene Panic: Contemporary Ecocriticism and the Issue of Human Numbers by Buell, Lawrence
Anthropocene Panic:
Contemporary Ecocriticism and
the Issue of Human Numbers
The Harvard community has made this
article openly available.  Please share  how
this access benefits you. Your story matters
Citation Buell, Lawrence. 2016. Anthropocene Panic: Contemporary




Terms of Use This article was downloaded from Harvard University’s DASH
repository, and is made available under the terms and conditions






            Anthropocene Panic 
                    Contemporary Ecocriticism and the Issue of Human Numbers 
                                              @ 2016 LAWRENCE BUELL 
Environmental humanists rightly believe they have valuable contributions to make to rethinking 
and redressing Anthropocene Age excess. Ecocriticism’s recent maturation as an interdiscipline 
has put it in a stronger position to do so than ever before. Its “material” turn in the 2000s bears 
this out up to a point, but its interventions also seem somewhat self-limiting. This essay argues 
that ecocritics and environmental humanists more generally have foregone a promising 
opportunity by avoiding the controversial issue of unsustainable human population growth as a 
sociohistorical phenomenon and an impetus to creative imagination.   
     
Few should be surprised by the environmental humanities’ keen interest in the “Anthropocene” 
hypothesis, however often specialists remind us that it remains to be canonized by the 
International Union of Geological Sciences (Autin and Holbrook). Not long after entering 
circulation in 2000, the term went viral across the human as well as natural sciences into the 
public sphere, as a ready-to-hand signifier and conduit of already widespread convictions that 
planetary change had become increasingly and perhaps irreversibly anthropogenic since 
industrial modernity. The marine scientist and atmospheric chemist who co-coined the term 
backdated the idea to the first major conservationist manifesto, George Perkins Marsh’s 1864 
Man and Nature; or The Earth as Modified by Human Action, long since reckoned a classic by 
environmental humanists (Crutzen and Stoermer 17). So ecocritics were well prepared for 
Anthropocene proclamations. The term itself simply added momentum, urgency, gravity, to what 
they knew in their bones. After all, in literary history, the vulnerability of the physical world to 
anthropogenic degradation is attested as early as the first surviving major literary work, the 
Sumerian Epic of Gilgamesh. 
 Nor is it surprising that environmental humanists should believe, however hesitantly they 
express it, that they have a rightful place at the table today in parsing the arc of human 
dominance and what might be done about restraining it from destructive extremes. The present 
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symposium is at least the sixth such special issue for an academic journal.1  Although the natural 
and quantitative social sciences predictably see themselves and tend to be seen by the public as 
the anointed monitors of the indices of environmental change, when it comes to defining 
pathways toward a more environmentally sustainable future, the challenges are too large and 
multifarious to be left to “science” alone. Indeed, “scientifically-informed” proposals are now 
framed in increasing awareness that they will fail without taking due account of such qualitative 
factors as cultural idiosyncrasy, ethico-spiritual values, and aesthetic preferences that ensure 
actual persons and peoples don’t behave like textbook rational actors. As one recent, well-
received attempt to define the ingredients of a “sustainability science” for the twenty-first 
century affirms, the understanding of what deserves to count as sustainable development has 
matured “from simple relationships that see human prosperity primarily in terms of economic 
growth” to “the ever more encompassing and nuanced views centered on social well-being 
advanced today” (Matson, Clark, and Andersson 3). Although the authors’ five-pillar 
“framework for sustainability analysis”—natural capital, human capital, manufactured capital, 
social capital, knowledge capital—is too stolid to assimilate such messy factors as local 
knowledge, cultural norms, and social custom beyond a limited degree, at least they have made 
the effort (14-51). Indeed my own experience in cross-disciplinary dialogue suggests that natural 
and social scientists are often at least as interested—however insouciantly—in insights 
environmental humanists might have to offer them as “we” are in “theirs.” 
 
           Ecocriticism Confronts the Anthropocene 
What then might “we” have to offer?—meaning especially for present purposes we whose bases 
of operation fall within the various discursive camps that have gathered during the 1990s and 
2000s around the disciplinary home base of literature-and-environment studies. Since its 
crystallization in the early 1990s as a small insurgency within (mostly Anglo-American) 
literature studies, ecocriticism has cross-pollinated across the disciplines, in a series of waves or 
stages. It has become markedly larger, more critically sophisticated, and—within academia, 
anyhow—more competitive as a field in which graduate students are educated and faculty 
                                                
1 Predecessors include “Writing in the Anthropocene,” ed. Deborah Rose, Australian Humanities Review 47 (2009); 
Tobias Boes and Kate Marshall, ed., Minnesota  Review 83, n.s. (2014); Greg Garrard, Gary Handwerk, and Sabine 
Wilke, ed., Environmental Humanities 5.1 (2014): 149-53; Barbara Eckstein, ed., “Genres of Climate Change,” 




recruited. Its impact so far has been chiefly “tribal,” however. Apart from achieving recognition 
as an academic-discursive enterprise, its influence has been scant. Even within the cloister it 
remains a dependent relation. Beyond the realm of arts and letters, its dialogues with other 
disciplines have been markedly one-sided. Ecocritics have been much more anxious about 
engaging environmental history, anthropology, geography, phenomenology, post-structuralist 
epistemologies, science studies, and so forth than practitioners in those fields have been about 
engaging theirs. Now and again, Donna Haraway, Bruno Latour, Slavoj Žižek, Richard White, 
and David Harvey may have paid a kind of glancing attention to the ecocritical scene, but clearly 
it hasn’t influenced their own projects nearly so much as vice-versa. 
 What, then, are the actual prospects for ecocriticism’s longstanding aspirations to make a 
wider impact both within academia and within the public sphere? Timothy Clark, a trenchant 
chastiser of his tribesmen’s limits, asserts that “a specific work of environmental criticism can 
only ever have a derivative impact, as a function, that is, of the social status and force already 
granted literature, criticism and the realm of cultural representations more generally” (190). 
Elsewhere he qualifies this downbeat assessment with some inventive proposals for the 
disruption of mainstream critical and creative spatiohistorical thinking that a robust confrontation 
with the stakes of the Anthropocene would demand. Meanwhile, it’s hard to disagree with that 
critique of business-as-usual ecocriticism, i.e. the kinds of close readings of cultural artifacts that 
literature studies specialists are trained to do—of artifacts that mostly turn on timebound human-
scale crises and dilemmas, which almost by definition seem a mismatch for the vastly larger 
geologic-temporal scale of Anthropocene thinking.    
Beyond that, it must be granted that the conceptual underpinnings of ecocriticism’s first 
several waves were themselves derivative: nature-protectionist “ecocentric” environmentalism 
for the 1990s, post-Marxist and critical race critiques of socioenvironmental inequalities for 
environmental justice ecocriticism of the turn of the century, and postcolonial and global 
network theory for the third-wave worlding of ecocriticism’s horizons in the later 2000s. In this 
respect, the movement’s first notable harbinger was predictive: Joseph Meeker’s The Comedy of 
Survival (1973), an unabashedly derivative Darwinian allegory of Shakespearean comedy as 
encoding practices of adaptation. For most of its short history as a self-conscious movement, 
ecocriticism has relied more on recycling received models than generating new ones. It has been 
more a lagging indicator, in other words, than a leading one. 
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 It may be that the latest ecocritical wave, its “material” turn in the 2000s (cf. Iovino and 
Oppermann), will not only further consolidate its emergence intra-tribally as a robust subfield, 
but also percolate more influentially beyond its own ranks, through its auspicious combination of 
powerful analytical subtlety and resonance with the exigencies of the Anthropocene moment. 
One thinks for example of Stacy Alaimo’s theory of transcorporeal personhood—the porousness 
of human being itself to its environmental surround at the material-chemical level; of Timothy 
Morton’s theory of “hyperobjects”—global warming his example par excellence—within which 
we are irretrievably meshed but (therefore) cannot conceptualize; of Stephanie LeMenager’s and 
others’ critical-historical unpacking of the cocooning/addictive effects of fossil fuel culture 
(Alaimo 85-140; Morton; LeMenager, Barrett and Worden). 
 These and kindred interventions, disparate though they are, might lumpingly be 
characterized as rotating around a “posthumanist” understanding of humanity’s place on earth 
excellently fitted, at least up to a point, to speak to the crucial paradox of Anthropocene being: 
that humanity as a species is the primary driver of planetary environmental change, yet 
inextricably entangled somatically, attitudinally, ethically, politically within the technosocial 
apparatuses of human making on the one hand, and with non-human life forms from the gigantic 
to the microbial on the other.2   
 That said by way of hopeful praise, the posthumanism—or posthumanisms—of 
ecocriticism’s material turn have yet to confront at least two semi-related kinds of endemic 
hazards. The first, of which Morton’s Hyperobjects is a good case in point, is the risk of taking 
principled critique of autonomous human agency to the point of disenabling gridlock: the 
Anthropocene “is too much to take in at once. Not only are we waking up inside of a gigantic 
object like finding ourselves in the womb again, but a toxic womb—but we are responsible for 
it” (183). Such pushbacks against anthropocentric hubris might be justified at a meta-level as 
salutary correctives to the doggedly hopeful, fingers-crossed instrumental reform advocacy of, 
say, developmental economist Jeffrey Sachs’s The Age of Sustainable Development (2015) (this 
century could be the age of sustainable development if everything falls into line), and economists 
Gernot Wagner and Martin Weitzman’s Climate Shock (2015) (maybe a carbon tax will do the 
                                                
2 Two of the many primers on posthumanism I have found especially instructive are Cary Wolfe, What Is 




trick). But the ontological counter-model of Lord Man crippled by extrasomatic material agency 
is not likely to gain much public traction ethically, let alone politically.   
 Relatedly problematic is Anthropocene-era ecocriticism’s tendency to look to speculative 
fiction and film as the preferred aesthetic carrier of the critique of anthropogenic disarrangement, 
as in a number of the contributions to the Anthropocene-focused ecocritical symposia cited 
earlier. Again Clark seems on target: “Extreme environmental scenarios unfold with a kind of 
remorseless logic whose effect of protest is undone” by an aesthetic “of increasing suspense, in 
which horror merges with a kind of gripping excitement” or “phantasmagoria, an 
unacknowledged indulgence in a pleasurable destructiveness” (182). From highbrow to 
middlebrow to low—Margaret Atwood’s MaddAddam trilogy, Nathaniel Rich’s The Odds 
Against Tomorrow, the American films Beasts of the Southern Wild and The Day After 
Tomorrow—with scattered exceptions, such performances stand guilty as charged. The problem 
with cli-fi apocalypticism’s is not, then, its potential box-office appeal—even to nonhumanist 
academics. Indeed, scientists have also been enlisting it (cf. Firor and Jacobsen, 1-22; Oreskes 
and Conway, 2013, 2014). The problem is rather that the longstanding prehistory of end-of-the-
world-as-we-know-it apocalypticism as narrative trope, whether religious or secular (the Book of 
Revelation, Lucretius’s De Rerum Naturae: take your pick), made such vicarious futurism so 
comfortably predictable long before 2000.  Since then, the uptick of as yet unfulfilled prophecies 
of anthropogenic destruction of the world from the Cold War era onward has conditioned most 
consumers of the genre into the doublethink of notional agreement that we may well be living in 
the end times, but that THE REAL END probably isn’t going to happen anytime soon. And why 
not? Because apocalypticism is a mismatch for the “slow violence” of how environmental 
deterioration actually works, not only in regions of the exploited global south to which rich 
world perpetrators turn a blind eye, as ecocritic Rob Nixon contends, but within the 
environments of the denizens of the rich world too (Nixon; cf. Buell 177-208).3   
 What, then, might be an alternative path for ecohumanistic critique that would avoid the 
kinds of problems just described? The rest of this essay will explore one such—not intending to 
offer it as the only option and without retracting anything said above in admiration of the 
cogency and subtlety of the best eco-posthumanist work. The path chosen here is to single out a 
major but neglected major aggravator of Anthropocene-era disarrangement; one that falls 
                                                
3 Adam Trexler’s Anthopocene Fictions pertinently suggests that the dearth of “realist climate change novel[s] could 
be a symptom of a deeper cultural resistance to the Anthropocene itself” (224).  
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squarely if not exclusively in the domain of the humanities insofar as it boils down to matters of 
ethical and cultural bias/preference; one less effectively addressed by techno-scientific 
“solutions” than by sociocultural politics and personal choice; and one that also showcases the 
limitations of sci-fi apocalypticism as a countervailing force, even when brilliantly deployed.4 
 
        Discourses of Human Population Growth Revisited 
The dramatic shrinkage during the past several decades from progressive environmentalist 
discourse of the overpopulation imaginary is a mystery hidden in plain sight. If a space alien 
learned on arrival on this planet that “between 1945 and 2015, some two-thirds of the population 
growth in the history of our species took place within one human lifetime” (McNeill and Engelke 
41), she or he might be forgiven for expecting that earthlings would be at least as concerned 
about that explosion in human numbers as about climate aberration, biodiversity and habitat loss, 
pollution, and fresh water supply. Half a century ago that was so, but no longer. Even though 
most who spend serious time worrying about earth’s environmental future might well concur that 
“if the world does not solve the population problem, it will have a much harder time 
accomplishing virtually every other desired [environmental] goal” (Firor and Jacobsen 84), the 
growth of human numbers as an exacerbator of environmental degradation has been largely 
relegated to the fiefdoms of a handful of international agencies or NGOs and voices from the 
discursive margins. In the 1960s, it was au courant to speak of “the modern plague of 
overpopulation,” as Martin Luther King did in accepting the Margaret Sanger Award (King). 
Stanford entomologist Paul Erlich catapulted to instant celebrity on the basis of his best-selling 
The Population Bomb (1968). In the 2010ss he continues to press a revised version of his case, 
but to much smaller audiences.  
 No one factor accounts for this attitudinal shift, although several seem incontestable. First 
and most obviously, Erlich’s prophecy of imminent worldwide famine and starvation within the 
next decade proved dead wrong—a classic case of demographer Joel Cohen’s “Law of 
Prediction”: “the more confidence someone places in an unconditional prediction of what will 
happen in human affairs, the less confidence you should place in that prediction” (134). Erlich’s 
and other “limits to growth” jeremiads grossly underestimated the impact of the Green 
Revolution just then underway. Most pointedly for present purposes, they failed to anticipate the 
                                                




dramatic drop in worldwide fertility that had also begun, from an all-time modern high of 5.0 
children per woman in the 1950s and early 1960s to 2.5 in 2015, including sub-replacement 
birthrates in many nations of the developed world as low as 1.2 that have provoked fears, 
particularly in Europe and Japan, of infertility crisis, disproportionately aging populations, and 
shrinking workforce.5 
Attempts to limit human population increase during the past half century have been 
further tainted by highly-publicized cases of coercion—most notoriously forced abortion and 
sterilization in India and China of the 1970s and after, refracted through world literature in such 
works as Salman Rushdie’s Booker Prize-winning Midnight’s Children (1981) and Nobel 
laureate Mo Yan’s Frog (2009, tr. 2016).  And tainted further by their association, partly 
justified, with racist eugenic campaigns dating back to the early 1900s to weed out “defective” or 
otherwise undesirable populations; by spasms of white/nativist anti-immigration pushback; and 
by narrowly-targeted efforts to dispense technologies of contraception ideologically offensive to 
influential religious conservatives and often also chastised by progressive social activists as 
insufficient in their education and social outreach efforts. 
For such reasons as these, not to mention the mounting fixation since the 1990s on global 
warming as the key driver of Anthropocene derangement in most urgent need of address now, 
the specter of overpopulation has been treated by most environmental researchers as a side-issue, 
broached gingerly for the most part, if not dismissed as a canard or shunned as taboo. When I 
asked an economist colleague who had participated in the 2015 Paris summit on climate change 
whether population had been discussed, his arch reply was “Ah, that which is not to be named.” 
Indeed, in the 2000s the issue of geoengineering is a far livelier topic among environmental 
economists and scientists than the growth of world population by another billion within the next 
fifteen years, above and beyond the last billion added since the early 2000s. “In ecocriticism,” as 
Greg Garrard observes, we find much the same: “just as in mainstream environmentalism, 
population is virtually unspeakable” (55).  Donna Haraway’s  emphatic “make kin, not babies” is 
an outlier that confirms standard practice, as a one-sentence parting shot in her main text with 
explanation furnished only below the line, as it were, in a long end note (Haraway 162 and n).  
                                                
5 “The Empty Crib,” The Economist 420.9004 (27 August 2016): 14-16, is broadly typical both of that magazine and 




The prevailing assumption that underwrites the contemporary tendency to minimize the 
environmental significance of the unprecedented twentieth-century quintupling of human 
numbers appears to be that the world population problem seems likely to peak within the next 
century (at 11 billion or so, from its present 7.5), maybe sooner (UN 1), because the “second 
demographic transition,” as some social psychologists have termed it (cf. Lesaghe), promises to 
spread worldwide: a shift toward later and fewer children following from the rising status, 
education, and aspirations of women; from urbanization; from the dissemination of social 
prosperity, however uneven and slow; and from postponement and/or decline in the long-term 
monogamous marriage.6  So conservation biologist-polymath Edward O. Wilson, who 
maintained in the 1990s that “the time has come to speak more openly of a population policy” 
based on “the judgment of [each country’s] informed citizenry” of its “optimal population,” now 
affirms that the population “will be solved as an unintended consequence of human nature” 
(Wilson 1993: 329; Wilson, Half-Earth 191). This is by no means a unique instance of side-
switching among prominent environmental researchers.7   
In short, though the awakening-in-progress to the sense of living in the Anthropocene has 
generally seemed vertiginous and alarming, world population trend lines have provoked more 
hope than alarm. If the late-century “burst in human population growth” is really “coming to an 
end,” at least eventually (McNeill and Engelke 209), just how much should one worry even if 
“the number of people added to the world population during the lifetime of today’s young people 
is likely to exceed the world’s total population in the middle of the twentieth century”? (Matson, 
Clark, and Andersson 42-3). Surely they can be squeezed in somehow. And might not some 
degree of planetary degradation be tolerated for the sake of sustaining economic growth? 
It’s hard not to feel a certain relief at such hopefulness, if only because of the uptick of 
Anthropocene doom-crying (“My God, a continent-sized ice shelf has broken off from 
                                                
6 This hasty summation homogenizes nuanced differences within what seems a broad concurrence, also omitting 
some interesting alternate lines of explanation, such as the importance attached by Winter and Teitlebaum to 
contemporary “risk society” anxieties in declining birthrates worldwide. 
7 The most telling instance of how prevailing winds of doctrine have changed since the 1970s, which also shows the 
folly of rushing to judgment when a thinking person changes position on this or any other issue, is that of John 
Holdren, Assistant for Science and Technology under President Obama, one of Paul Erlich’s closest colleagues and 
an overpopulation hawk through the 1970s (cf. Holdren). In the 1980s, Holdren switched his primary research and 
advocacy commitments to nuclear disarmament and energy technology; yet he continues to be hounded by right-
wing bloggers who mine his early work for extreme statements (cf. “John Holdren in His Own (Radical) Words,” 31 
May 2014, www.cfact.org ). For an even-handed assessment of the larger issues at stake in the underlying dispute 
between pro-growth and limits-to-growth persuasions, including an important caveat that Erlich’s Malthusianism 
may be more relevant to our time than his, see Sabin 224-7. 
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Antarctica!” “Scores of low-lying island nations face imminent doom!”). But to subside into 
complacency is misguided. 
To begin with, “no developing country has successfully modernized without slowing 
population growth” (Brown 185); and there’s no guarantee that the countries with the highest 
fertility rates today—most of them, like Somalia and Burundi, gravely under-resourced, conflict-
ridden lands with birthrates above 5.5 per woman—will make the transition any time soon. The 
UN projection that Niger, with the world’s highest fertility rate today at 7.63 will decline by 
2050 to 4.87 seems wishful at best (UN 43). Relatedly, the next billion infants projected to 
increase the world’s human population by another 13% within the next fifteen years will be born 
in Sub-Saharan Africa and parts of South Asia rather than the ecologically “best places,” such as 
the better water-sourced, relatively less populated areas of north central North America, South 
America, and the lower Russian steppes, according to one thoughtful recent study (Forman and 
Wu). Yet most people prefer to stay put; historically, international migration rates “have 
averaged only 10% or so of global birth rates” (Matson, Clark, and Andersson 44). The 
recluctance of modernized European, North American, and East Asian countries to accept 
anything like a fair proportional share of refugees from the Middle East and North Africa 
suggests that that figure will not rise much anytime soon. 
Were the modernization barrier surmounted worldwide—let’s assume so for the sake of 
argument—it would hugely aggravate Anthropocene-era environmental derangement through the 
dramatic increase in the average human’s ecological footprint, as is now happening in China and 
elsewhere. Planet earth “could possibly hold ten billion modest vegetarians, but could not sustain 
ten or even our current [7.5] billion people [if an appreciable number of others become] as 
wealthy as we” (Rieder 3). For all its rhetorical fluorescence, Jared Diamond’s insistence “that 
no one at the U.N. or in First World governments is willing to acknowledge ... the 
unsustainability of a world in which the Third World’s large population were to reach and 
maintain First World living standards” makes a telling point (496). Why that should be so is 
understandable enough: few today, even among the Euro-world’s entrenched elites, deny the 
legitimacy of the global south’s aspirations to social prosperity, even as prosperous folk 
everywhere dislike making major retrenchments in their own lifestyles. That in turn redoubles 
the cogency of an argument that voices from the developing world have made for decades, such 
as Mahdav Gadgil and Ramachandra Guha in their 1995 assessment of ecological politics in 
India: Yes, the Subcontinent should control population growth, but “if there is a [world] 
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population problem at all, it exists in affluent consumer societies such as the United States” 
(181), where the birth of a single child has “an environmental impact equal to that of (say) the 
birth of several dozen Bangladeshi” (178). Indeed, that estimate may have been far too modest; a 
more recent calculation sets the differential at 160 (Ryerson 158). Although the U.S. population 
is less than 5% of the world total, its outsized ecological footprint makes it “in a real sense the 
most populous nation on earth” (McKibben 108)—all the more so to the extent that American 
materialism remains the envy of the rest of the world.  Much the same might be said of most rich 
world countries as seen from the perspective of the global south. 
Hence in part Pope Francis’ refusal in his encyclical Laudato Si “to blame population 
growth instead of extreme and selective consumerism” for global resource depletion (22). Here 
and elsewhere, the Pope sounds like left-progressive-secular climate activist Naomi Klein in This 
Changes Everything: Capitalism vs. the Climate: “positing of population control as a solution to 
climate change is a distraction and moral dead end,” because “the most significant cause of rising 
emissions is not the reproductive behavior of the poor but the consumer behaviors of the rich” 
(114).Klein would indict the capitalist system root and branch as the cause of all environmental 
woes, Francis would drive home his eco-justice critique of blatant inequality between peasant 
and grandee without unsettling official Catholic doctrine, which opposes most methods of birth 
control. 
 Their lopsided overgeneralizations revive, albeit not quite to the same end, the straw man 
long since rejected by persons of conscience in principle if not in practice, that the lives of the 
poor and the dark count for less than that of affluent Euros.  
In so doing, both dismiss a readier-to-hand, inexpensive, and potentially even less 
controversial means of countering Anthropocene environmental derangement than either the 
paths of economic redistributionism or conversion to renewable energy sources on a scale that 
would end fossil fuel dependence, namely, fewer unwanted pregnancies and births through truly 
comprehensive non-coercive propagation of both the knowledge and means to those who lack 
them, and more persuasive cultural reinforcement of smaller-family ethics. As environmental 
journalist Alan Weisman points out, concerted efforts of this kind have achieved dramatic 
results, perhaps nowhere more so than Iran after 1989 (a UN-award winning initiative ironically 
reversed in the 2000s) (273-93).   
What’s more—and here is where the ecocritical part potentially plays the largest part—
creative media directed at popular audiences seem to have been a significant influence to this 
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end. The best-known case, developed by Mexican media executive Miguel Sabido in the late 
1970s and adapted in other developing countries since, was a series of prime-time Mexican 
“serial dramas” or telenovelas that ran for nearly a decade, stories that literary brought home to 
ordinary people the benefits of the correlation between family planning, family harmony, and 
national health and well-being. Though no “scientific” correlation can be proven, this same 
decade saw the steepest decline (34%) in the Mexican birthrate, which dropped from 5.40 to 2.29 
between 1975 and 2015 (Ryerson 170-1; Population Media Center; U. N. 40). 
The feel-good, down-home, melodramatic genre(s) of narrative soap opera are a far cry 
from apocalyptic sci fi and its neo-naturist sibling, “dysanthropic” films that highlight the 
expanse and power of physical nature as devoid of human presence as the camera can make it 
(Garrard 45-9). However riveting at best, though, the latter are also more easily dismissible for 
their combination of recycling overly familiar “empty landscape” tropes and remoteness from the 
quotidian.   
When 1970s population-bomb scare stories ceased to be front-page news, overpopulation 
stories “waned dramatically” (Stableford and Langford). The few that continue to pop up—like 
L. R. Currell’s Curve Day (2013)—whose imagined antidote to overpopulation is an annual 
killing spree where almost anyone but police is fair game—are a sad comedown from the brainy 
prescience and psychosocial complexity of the techno-genetic futurism of John Brunner’s Stand 
on Zanzibar (1968) and Harry Harrison’s images of twenty-first century New York City as third-
world megacity, Make Room, Make Room! (1966), bastardized in the 1973 film Soylent Green.  
Meanwhile, the seeming quaintness of even top-cut 1960s overpopulation lit by contrast to 
today’s cli-fi only goes to show the ephemerally labile character of the apocalypse trope itself. 
The chance of lasting impact might be greater were a latter-day U.S.-based Sabido to 
deploy—and sustain—the resources of a media empire to tackling the country’s two most 
recalcitrant social norms in respect to population concerns. The better known is the zeal of so-
called pro-life advocates since the 1970s to hobble family planning programs domestically and 
worldwide by damning all such efforts categorically with the stigmas of abortion and/or coercion 
(Barot and Cohen). Even more fundamental, however, are the lingering biases against single- or 
no-child unions and in favor of large families that flourish widely enough in today’s U.S. to put 
the country at the high end among G-8 nations plus  China in fertility trend-line as well as in 
religiosity, and to make it the only one of the nine projected among the top fifteen contributors to 
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world population increase between 2015 and 2050.8 Right now, as Bill McKibben pithily 
observes, “it’s fine to have single parents on TV, but single children are scarce” (33). That he 
even feels the need to write as if few even notice the imbalance testifies to the pervasiveness of 
the problem.    
This essay should not be misunderstood as insinuating that my country is already filled to 
carrying capacity. There’s still room for many more of those next billion than the anti-
immigrationist lobby contends. Nor should it be mistaken as a plea to keep as much of the U.S. 
as wild or rustic as possible. My core arguments are rather that environmental sustainability 
goals should assign a higher priority to curtailing world population increase; that responsibility 
for so doing should be proportional to the size of the ecological footprint, with the primary onus 
on rich world nations and privileged socioeconomic groups everywhere; that preferences for 
smaller families can be quickly “woven into the cultural fabric of the nation” (qtd. Weisman 
278); and that creative intervention in attention-getting media of whatever sort can significantly 
matter to that end.9 
 
                                                
8 The U.N. figures for 2010-2015 put the U.S. fertility rate at 1.89, slightly below France (2.0) and the U.K. (1.92), 
but well above Canada, Germany, Russia, China, Italy, and Japan (1.61 to 1.4, in descending order) (38-42). 
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